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An era has ended with the passing of our late Chief
Justice. To this man, who made us all proud to be
lawyers, we dedicate this issue.
The Editors
Chief Justice Warren: The Enigma
of Leadership
Abe Fortast
The Chief Justice of the United States is inevitably the chairman of
the judicial collegium. He is not always its leader. He calls the meet-
ing to order; he arranges the agenda-within limits; he directs the work
traffic-within limits; and he has certain procedural duties and pro-
cedural prerogatives, some of which significantly affect the Court's
product. When the Chief Justice is in the majority, he assigns the
writing of the opinion of the Court in particular cases. This is a func-
tion of great significance. If the Chief Justice assigns the writing of
the opinion of the Court to Mr. Justice A, a statement of profound
consequence may emerge. If he assigns it to Mr. Justice B, the opinion
of the Court may be of limited consequence.
Apart from his special functions and administrative powers, the
Chief Justice is in a position to be something more than an equal
among equals. His position carries enormous prestige. This prestige
not only affects the public, the bar and the bench generally, but it
also makes it possible for the Chief Justice to influence the output of
the Court, to a much greater degree than colleagues of equal or supe-
rior personal and professional calibre.
Of the 13 Chief Justices who served prior to Earl Warren, common
t Former Associate Justice, United States Supreme Court; Member, District of Colum-
bia Bar.
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consent, I think, would ascribe qualities of outstanding leadership to
Marshall and Hughes. These were quite different types of men, men
of vastly different gifts, men of substantially different backgrounds,
and the leadership that each exercised manifested itself in very dif-
ferent ways.
Earl Warren, as a man and a Chief Justice, clearly belongs in this
special category. He differed in background, temperament, interests
and techniques from both Marshall and Hughes, but he was undeni-
ably more than one among nine Justices. He was significantly respon-
sible for the quality of the Court's output during his tenure. He amply
deserved the title of Super-Chief which Mr. Justice Douglas bestowed
upon him.
We know this; we feel it. But when we attempt to identify the
ingredients-the particulars-of Warren's leadership, we find great
difficulty." He made no apparent effort to impress his views upon his
brethren. He was no more emphatic than some of them in stating his
conclusions. He did not attempt to persuade by one-to-one, off-the-
record sessions. He did not convert his fellow Justices by the kind
of penetrating, irresistible, jugular stroke which is so often the con-
tribution of Mr. Justice Douglas. He did not press his brethren against
a stone wall of logic and stem assurance in the manner that character-
ized the formidable Hugo Black. His effectiveness did not stem from
the kind of calm and impressive scholarship that was the contribution
of John Harlan.
By some process short of the occult, however, Warren was a great,
powerful leader. Probably some of the great decisions of the Warren
Court would have come even if the Chief Justice had added no more
than his vote-and in some instances, even without his vote. But some
of them would still lie unborn in the pregnant precepts of our Con-
stitution if it had not been for Earl Warren; if it had not been for the
quality that his personality brought to the Court and his colleagues-
for his simple view that the imperatives of truth and justice and fair-
ness could not, and should not, be avoided; and if it had not been for
the standard that his courage and steadfastness set for his colleagues.
To Warren, the Supreme Court was a temple dedicated to justice. He
was its father-figure, and in such a setting his good and worthy col-
leagues were inspired and emboldened to seek and maintain the ideal-
ism of our Constitution and system of laws.
1. The nature, ingredients and emergence of leadership are currently the subject of
fascinating scholarly and clinical investigation by psychiatrists, psychologists and social
scientists. See W. BION, EXPERIENCES IN GROUPS AND OTHER PAPERS (1961); A. RICE, LEARN-
ING FOR LEADERSHIP (1965); Rioch, Followers and Leaders, 34 PSYCHIATRY 258 (1971).
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Throughout his term as Chief Justice, Warren had the benefit of
a core of Justices whose basic constitutional commitments were con-
genial to his own. This core expanded and contracted as Justices died,
retired, or resigned, and successors were qualified; and various of the
Justices who were sturdy proponents of some of the views that Warren
held, were unyielding opponents of other positions.2
If the Chief Justice's convictions had been contrary to those of the
formidable majority with whom he served for most of his tenure,
would the great decisions have emerged? In the five-four decisions, his
vote was, of course, crucial, but no more so than that of any other
Justice in the majority. In the cases where the majority was larger,
would Warren's absence as Chief Justice have made a difference in the
outcome? Would the great issues have been considered by the Court,
or would the administrative powers of a hostile Chief Justice-or the
climate that an unsympathetic Chief Justice might create-have rele-
gated some of the crucial cases to the "Never-is-too-soon" box which
the Court has available to it? If the cases had been considered by the
Court, would the majority, ex Warren, nevertheless have persisted?
In all probability, some of the great decisions were foreordained, and
it is arguable that they would have been handed down even in the
absence of Warren. Some of the fundamentally significant decisions
of the Warren Court, properly viewed, were the culminating-and
perhaps inevitable-steps in an evolutionary process that had been
underway for a long period of time, during the pre-Warren Courts.
This is true of the decision which, in social terms, was the most revolu-
tionary of all: Brown v. Board of Education (1954).3 Brown and com-
panion cases were before the Court when Warren assumed office. Their
antecedents left little basis for choice as to how their issues must be
decided. The six prior cases involving the "separate but equal" doc-
trine in public education were inexorable building blocks to Brown:
steps progressively demonstrating that the "separate but equal" doc-
trine could not be defended; that it was, at best, shabby temporization;
that it was neither workable in practice nor defensible as constitutional
2. During all of Warren's tenure, he had the immeasurable benefit of the work of
Justices Black and Douglas. Mr. Justice Brennan joined the Court in the third term of
the Warren Court (1956). This formidable trio was frequently joined by Tom Clark who
served from the outset of Warren's term until his retirement in 1967. Clark was succeeded
by Mr. Justice Thurgood Marshall, who, on crucial issues, shared the views of Warren,
Black, Douglas, and Brennan. Arthur Goldberg and the author of this article together
spanned the period from 1962 to 1969. Justices Stewart and Frankfurter, each from the
different viewpoint of his own philosophy and constitutional conception, also shared from
time to time in the elevation of constitutional principle which occurred under Chief
Justice Warren.
3. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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principle. 4 It was the rapid development of racial activism among
blacks in the late 'forties and early 'fifties that brought the evolutionary
trend to an inescapable climax. 5 Indeed, anything less than unanimity
in Brown would have been surprising. Every Associate Justice who sat
in Brown had joined in the Court's opinions, written by Chief Justice
Vinson in 1950, in Sweatt v. Painter' and McLaurin v. Oklahoma State
Board of Regents.7 These opinions really sealed the fate of the "sepa-
rate but equal" doctrine. After these decisions, Brown was inevitable.
Gideon v. Wainwright (1963),8 decided by a unanimous Court,
similarly, although not so clearly, seems to have been foreordained.
Betts v. Brady (1942),1 in which the Court declined to hold that the
Fourteenth Amendment required appointment of counsel for an in-
digent defendant in a state felony proceeding, had been massively
eroded. Hamilton v. Alabama (1961)10 had held that if a defendant
was accused of a capital offense, an absolute right to counsel existed.
In a number of other cases, the Court had held that "special circum-
stances" existed which made Betts inapplicable and that the Fourteenth
Amendment required the state to appoint counsel." As Justice Harlan,
concurring in Gideon, wryly pointed out, the Court had come to
realize "that the mere existence of a serious criminal charge constituted
in itself special circumstances requiring the services of counsel at trial.
In truth the Betts v. Brady rule is no longer a reality."'12
The significant fact about Gideon, however, for purposes of ap-
praisal of the Warren Court and its leadership, is not how it was
decided, but that the Court reached into the barrel of petitions for
certiorari and selected Gideon's handwritten petition for review. Un-
like Brown, Gideon was not on the judicial agenda when Warren be-
came Chief Justice. Gideon's case could easily have been avoided. It
4. Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950). Chief Justice Vinson's opinion for a unanimous
Court in Sweatt included this prophetic statement:
With such a substantial and significant segment of society excluded [from the law
school to which blacks were admitted], we cannot conclude that the education offered
petitioner is substantially equal to that which he would receive if admitted to the
University of Texas Law School.
Id. at 634.
5. One of the important relevant aspects of this development was increasing recourse
to the courts on behalf of blacks, under the able leadership of Thurgood Marshall and
Spotswood Robinson III, acting for and with the NAACP.
6. 339 U.S. 629 (1950).
7. 339 U.S. 637 (1950).
8. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
9. 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
10. 368 U.S. 52 (1961).
11. See, e.g., Williams v. Kaiser, 323 U.S. 471 (1945); Hudson v. North Carolina, 363 U.S.
697 (1960); Chewning v. Cunningham, 368 U.S. 443 (1962).
12. 372 U.S. at 351. Only two of the Justices in Betts v. Brady were on the Court when
Gideon was decided: Black and Douglas. Both had dissented in Betts.
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is, indeed, this action-the selection of cases for review-that may be a
more significant indicator of the vitality of the Court at a particular
time than the decisions that it reaches; and the courage and initiative
of the Warren Court in granting discretionary review and in choosing
to confront difficult issues, are perhaps its most conspicuous char-
acteristics.
In a somewhat similar category are the decisions of the Warren
Court with respect to civil rights and freedom of the press. There was
ample basis in precedent for such decisions as Sweezy v. New Hamp-
shire (1957)13 and New York Times Co. v. Sullivan (1964). 14 In cases
of this type, I believe it may fairly be said that the Warren Court
strengthened and broadened doctrine that had previously been estab-
lished. In so stating, I do not minimize the importance of the Court's
decisions, or the vision and steadfastness that those decisions required.
The Court could easily have avoided extending the logic of its past
decisions. It could easily have avoided the conversion of soft principle
into hard doctrine. But it did not do so.
The special quality of the Warren Court particularly emerges in its
decisions dealing with aspects of state law and procedure which had
been substantially immune from the impact of basic federal constitu-
tional principle. Brown and Gideon, of course, impinged upon state
jurisdiction, but in respects which could hardly be said to partake of
novelty. Baker v. Carr (1962)' 1 and Reynolds v. Sims (1964),16 however,
were truly innovative. There was undeniably precedent for the Court's
decisions but the question presented in Baker and Reynolds, it seems
to me, was substantively and qualitatively different from those with
which the precedents dealt. 7 In other words, there was ample room
for choice: Without moving out of the path of prior decisions, Justices
might easily have cast their vote against the one man, one vote rule. It
would have been easy, within conventional judicial standards, for the
Court to hold that a claim that state misapportionment was constitu-
tionally offensive did not present a justiciable controversy under the
Equal Protection Clause. To its credit, the Court did not do so. As
Chief Justice Warren keenly realized, state abuse of the oligarchic
weapon of apportionment had reached the point where it constituted
a massive debasement of the fundamental rights of citizens.' 8 The time
13. 354 U.S. 234 (1957).
14. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
15. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
16. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
17. E.g., United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941); United States v. Mosley, 238 U.S.
383 (1915); Ex parte Yarborough, 110 U.S. 651 (1884).
18. See Reynolds v. Sims, 337 U.S. 533, 556 n.30 (1964).
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had come to insist upon state conformity with a fundamental principle
of our Constitution-the right of every citizen to participate equally in
the selection of his governors. The rights of blacks, a frequent object of
disenfranchisement, were in process of full acknowledgement; and the
awareness of individuality and of the individual integrity of the people
of this Nation-particularly minorities and the poor-was a factor that
increasingly demanded implementation of long-restricted constitu-
tional principle.
Our Constitution and our Bill of Rights had been written idealis-
tically in the broad terms of all of the people, but in fact, masses of
people had been excluded from the benefit of significant provisions.
The focus of the contribution of the Warren Court was its attack upon
the restricted application of constitutional provision, largely, but not
entirely, due to the failure of the states to implement constitutional
commands, and to the subordination of federal constitutional principle
to state jurisdiction.
Nowhere was this distortion by the states of fundamental constitu-
tional principle more virulently in evidence than in the administration
of criminal law. In 1961, the Warren Court decided Mapp v. Ohio,'0
by a vote of six to three, overruling Wolf v. Colorado (1949).20 Mapp
was the cornerstone of the Court's series of decisions applying con-
stitutional principle to state criminal procedures. In my opinion, it
ranks with Brown and Reynolds as a fundamental decision of the
Warren Court. Justice Tom Clark, writing for the six-Justice majority
of the Court, stressed that Mapp was not an instant product. Rather,
he maintained, it was the Court's response to a problem with which it
had temporized in previous decisions,21 and which continued to be
intractable: the problem of state convictions based upon evidence ob-
tained in violation of fundamental constitutional right but nevertheless
received in evidence. To Justice Clark, "time ha[d] set its face" against
federal tolerance of state indulgence in arbitrary, unconstitutional
police procedure. I do not quarrel with Justice Clark's argument that
there was precedent which provided a basis for Mapp. Its doctrine was
firmly established in federal cases, 22 but the extension of the rule to
the states, despite the precedent of Wolf, was based upon constitu-
tional principle rather than a steady progression of decisional law.
Subsequent to Mapp, the Warren Court handed down its contro-
19. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
20. 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
21. See, e.g., Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128 (1954).
22. E.g., McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943).
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versial decisions in the field of criminal law enforcement. Perhaps the
most abrasive was Miranda v. Arizona (1966),23 a five-four decision
which deserves neither the abuse nor the acclaim that it has received.
It was a modest effort to assure that the right to counsel and the right
to avoid self-incrimination should have a degree of reality. In my opin-
ion, its significance is that someday, in a better world, it may be a
predicate for a ruling that confessions obtained by the police or
prosecutor, from a person in custody, are inadmissible if taken in the
absence of counsel for the defendant.
Objective analysis is generally useful, but often essentially spurious.
It is easy analytically to dissect the work of the Warren Court and
Warren's significance to it and to arrive at misleading conclusions. The
fact is that the Warren Court was both the product and a producer of
a profound moral, ethical and constitutional revolution. It functioned
in times when the demand for a full measure of human rights had
become insistent. Our Constitution, our Bill of Rights, had promised
that our government would accord that full measure. "Time had set
its face" against an apartheid society, against a selective application of
constitutional principle, against a half-a-loaf version of the noble
generalities of our social compact. And it was the Warren Court that
was the instrument and the motor of time's insistence.
Earl Warren, I think, was essential to the Court's response. I cannot
prove this by quantitative or objective evidence. His contribution
cannot be tallied. He provided an essence, an attitude, which set the
tone and quality of the Court's work. In a sense, he was a simple man.
His constant question was: Is this right or wrong? His answer was
always firmly rooted in a profound sense of justice and human dignity,
and in a simple and uncomplicated conception of the essential, noble
meaning of our Constitution's precepts.
This simple approach provided a firm foundation for his colleagues'
work. He was a constant reminder that the task of a judge is always to
seek the truth-the essential constitutional and human values at stake.
Because of his own quality, he was a constant reminder that neither
fear nor the intricacies of the legal craft should divert Justices from
this noble pursuit.
He was fearless; and his calm courage and steady course in face of
vicious assault clarified and simplified for his like-minded colleagues
the path to be pursued. In another sense, Warren provided for these
colleagues, in the event that any of them might have been tempted to
23. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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favor a less controversial career, a protective wall which rebuffed the
assaults of the Court's critics and the seductions of compromise.
Along with these qualities, Warren was an immensely attractive,
considerate and diplomatic leader. He was never divisive, impatient,
short-tempered or abrasive. He created an atmosphere of comradeship,
even within strongly felt and sometimes sharply stated disagreements.
No one differed with him personally, even if sharply differing with his
convictions and conclusions. It was this, along with Warren's qualities
of courage and insistence upon simplicities of fairness and justice, that
kept the Court on course, that averted fragmentation of its majority,
and that makes reference to the "Warren Court" eminently appro-
priate.
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